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Executive Summary
In February 2016, after a series of meetings 
between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya chiefs, 
a peace agreement was signed in Noong 
(west of Abyei). The local mediation was 
initiated in 2015 by Chief Nyuon Pagot, 
after a lack of cooperation between the 
two communities since the 2011 Abyei 
conflict. During this period, Concordis, an 
international non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), became involved to provide logistical 
support, and to help facilitate the meetings. 
They drew on their peacebuilding experience 
in Northern Bahr el Ghazal where they had 
mediated peace in Aweil between Dinka 
Malual and Misseriya Rezeigaat in 2015.
The process involved meetings, but also a 
prolonged commitment to trust building and 
truth telling. Concordis had to leave their 
work in Abyei after 2016 because of funding 
restraints, but peace meetings continued, 
supported by United Nations Interim 
Security Forces in Abyei (UNISFA) and other 
actors such as the World Food Programme 
(WFP), International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), and Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO). The continuation of 
these peace meetings after Concordis’ 
departure highlights their necessity, as well 
as the need for further continuity.   
The main implementation mechanism for 
the 2016 agreement was the formation of 
the Joint Community Peace Committee 
(JCPC) comprised of 10 Ngok Dinka 
and 10 Misseriya. This governing body’s 
functions included coordinating with 
UNISFA, organising migration conferences, 
supporting conflict resolution, ruling on 
compensation, and overseeing the work 
of its sub-committees, including the 
community police committee, a court, 
and a committee on trade. There is also a 
detention centre (two containers) provided 
by UNISFA. The agreement and JCPC have 
been lauded for reducing the number of 
killings and incidences of violence conflict. 
Peaceful pastoralist migrations into the 
Abyei area are now taking place. The Amiet 
Market is one of the biggest achievements 
of the agreement. Not only is the market a 
meeting place, but it stabilised the flow of 
goods to and from Sudan and South Sudan.  
However, the market itself is not without 
contestation; it constructs social hierarchies 
as much as mingling communities. For 
example, the traders and shop owners are 
consistently Misseriya, with Ngok Dinka only 
working as porters or owning tea shops. 
Revenues are seen to be flowing north, and 
social distinctions reinforced. The rapid 
growth of the market has also made it 
difficult to govern.  
A weakness of the local peace agreement 
(LPA) is that it relies heavily on external 
support from national and international 
bodies to be meaningful. UNISFA has 
been crucial in providing backing for the 
JCPC.  However, the political and economic 
interests of Sudan and South Sudan are very 
visible in the Abyei region. This has made 
it seemingly impossible for local peace to 
avoid being entangled with national politics.  
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Research Introduction and 
Background
Abyei sits on the contemporary border 
between Sudan and South Sudan and 
has been a site of contestation between 
these neighbouring countries, as well 
as between local figures of authority 
whose daily lives or annual migrations 
include Abyei. This contestation has been 
characterised by violence, particularly after 
the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) signed between the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and 
the Government of Sudan (GoS), in the lead 
to and aftermath of the referendum and the 
independence of South Sudan. Defined as 
the territory of nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms, 
Abyei was transferred by Administrative Act 
in 19051 by colonial authority to Western 
Kordofan. But Abyei fought the two South-
North wars (1955-1972) and (1983-2005) 
alongside Southern Liberation Movements. 
Their consistent attempts to rejoin Southern 
Sudan have always been resisted by 
the GoS. For example, the referendum 
provided for in the 1972 Addis Ababa peace 
agreement was not conducted.2
The 2005 CPA created a road map for the 
independence of South Sudan and, therefore, 
the creation of a national border in the Abyei 
region. People in Abyei were to be given 
the opportunity to vote in a referendum 
concurrently with the people of Southern 
Sudan at the end of the interim period of the 
CPA in 2011, on whether the region would 
be part of South Sudan. The Abyei Boundary 
Commission (ABC)3 was established by 
the CPA to define the Abyei area. The July 
2005 ABC’s report was rejected by the GoS 
and the Misseriya on the basis that the 
1 Concordis Peace Assessment Confidential Draft Report, 2014: Strengthening Civil Society Organizations to Adopt Nonviolence as a 
Strategy for Peacebuilding and Promoting Social Cohesion in Sudan.
2 Johnson, D. H. (2011) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars: Peace or Truce. Revised, edition. Kampala
Uganda: Fountain Publishers-Page 44.
3  Abyei Boundary Commission’s Report Part I.
4 Douglas Johnson Why Abyei Matters: The Breaking Point of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement; African Affairs, Volume 107, 
Issue 426, January 2008, Pages 1–19.
5  Report of International Arbitral Award: https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXX/417-487.pdf.
6  World Peace Foundation, Sudan Peace Archive, Abyei Final Status Proposals dl 121110, Abyei Final Status Proposals.
7 Conversation with Alex De Waal, former advisor to AUHIP’s Chair, President Thabo Mbeki and drafter of the Abyei Final Status propos-
als, July 2018.
Commission had exceeded its mandate.4 
The ruling of the Parament Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) at the Hague to which the 
case was transferred, was initially accepted 
by both National Congress Party (NCP) and 
SPLM, but the former has been reluctant to 
implement it.5 
The African Union High-Level 
Implementation Panel (AUHIP)6 drafted the 
Abyei Final Status document and discussed 
several ideas about the Northern part of 
the Abyei area to ascertain possibilities 
for that territory to be controlled by the 
Misseriya. AUHIP’s two options on the Abyei 
Final Status presented to the presidency 
were: administrative transfer to Southern 
Sudan with Misseriya rights (Option 1), or 
administrative partition of Abyei and a soft 
border (Option 2). Both proposals were 
rejected. Unhappy with leasing the northern 
part of Abyei, Ngok argued that the PCA 
award has already given a large portion 
of Abyei to the Misseriya. The Misseriya, 
on the other hand, insisted that no part of 
Sudan should be given away.7 It seems 
the expectations of both sides were that 
if Abyei became part of South Sudan, the 
border would be a hard one and would be 
difficult for people to cross, yet the Misseriya 
seasonally move their location. The failure to 
conduct the Abyei referendum was over how 
to interpret clauses in the Abyei Protocol 
on Residency and eligibility to vote in the 
referendum. Thus, international efforts at 
peacemaking did not make any meaningful 
progress. Additionally, peace efforts were 
regularly undermined by conflict including 
the Abyei wars of 2008 and 2011, which 
twice destroyed Abyei Town and resulted in 
massive displacement of people.
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In 2016, the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya 
signed a peace agreement which provided 
space for interactions between the two 
communities. The purpose of this research 
was to understand how that local peace 
agreement reduced violence and interacted 
with state and international dynamics across 
that international border; what did and did 
not work, and what lessons could be learned. 
The study is part of the broader Conflict 
Research Programme (CRP). 
The overall goal of CRP is to provide an 
evidence-based strategic re-orientation 
of international engagement in places 
afflicted by the world’s most intractably 
violent conflicts, such as that of South 
Sudan. “A key objective of the CRP, and a key 
contribution to the ‘Better Delivery’ agenda 
within the Department for International 
Development (DFID), is to make policies 
better targeted, more nuanced, and rooted in 
a clear understanding of the social condition 
that undergirds persistent contemporary 
conflict.”8 This study was conducted before 
the Sudanese Revolution which resulted in 
a coup d’état that deposed former President 
Omar al Bashir on 11 April 2019. This change 
might affect both the LPA and the Abyei 
Final Status. The relationships between 
the Sudanese and the South Sudanese 
governments have since been cordial.
The study answered the questions: How 
have local mediations in the Abyei area 
reduced violence and interacted with state 
and international dynamics across South 
Sudan and the Sudan border? What did and 
did not work in these mediations and why? 
What lessons can be learnt?
8 Conflict Research Programme Synthesis Paper-South Sudan: Presented by Alex De Waal at the South Sudan CRP Panel Meeting in 
Arusha, Tanzania July 2018.
9 Concordis Peace Assessment Confidential Draft Report, 2014: Strengthening Civil Society Organizations to Adopt Nonviolence as a 
Strategy for Peacebuilding and Promoting Social Cohesion in Sudan
Methodology and Theoretical 
Framework
The methodology combined desk review and 
field research. A critical review and analysis 
of a wide range of relevant literature was 
conducted. Data was collected from Abyei 
and elsewhere between January-April 2019 
through in-depth open-ended interviews. 
Participants included traditional authorities 
(chiefs and elders), community and religious 
leaders, Abyei Administrative Area (AAA) 
officials, civil society, women, and youth. 
Staff of UNISFA, African Union (AU), Sudan/
South Sudan Liaison office at the AU, and 
Abyei people living outside of Abyei were 
also interviewed. The analysis was grounded 
on identity politics and theories of ethnic 
conflicts as the theoretical framework. This 
concentrated on a socio-political mapping 
of the structural drivers of conflict and the 
groups involved in political mobilisation and 
coercion. Identity politics is a counterpart 
of the political marketplace, both of 
which flourish in conditions of persistent 
uncertainty, conflict, and trauma. 
Local Mediation and Role of 
Concordis 
After five years of lack of cooperation 
between Ngok and Misseriya, as a result of 
the 2008 and 2011 Sudan and South Sudan 
wars in Abyei, exacerbated by the killing of 
the Ngok paramount chief Kuol Deng Kuol in 
May 2013,9 Ngok Chief Nyoul Pagot initiated 
contact with Misseriya Chiefs in 2015.  The 
impact of the 2013 eruption of conflict in 
South Sudan on Ngok and the 2015 drought 
on Misseriya were key motivations. Routes 
were closed and there were shortages of 
food and other commodities in Abyei after 
2013. The Misseriya, for their part, were 
desperate after the 2015 drought to gain 
access to water and pasture, as their cattle 
were dying. In a sustained identity conflict 
where both sides appear determined for 
confrontation, there may be some individual 
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and institutional expression of civicness 
as a logic of public authority, in this case 
(customary authority), or a form of behaviour 
or a political position that promotes dialogue 
or peaceful means of conflict settlement. 
The role played by local actors created 
some understanding between the two 
communities amidst political interference 
from provincial and state levels. These 
actors set the agenda and facilitated 
discussions. Meetings were chaired by tribal 
chiefs: Chief Bakat of Manyuar Ngok Dinka 
section chaired the first meeting in Noong.10 
Issues discussed reflect communal needs 
and concerns: livelihoods, security, and 
economic activities. Concordis facilitated 
logistics and drew on its 2015 peacebuilding 
experience in Northern Bahr el Ghazal 
where it mediated peace in Aweil between 
Dinka Malual and Misseriya Rezeigaat.11The 
similarities of issues faced by Northern Bahr 
el Ghazal and Abyei people, both nomads, 
made it easier for Concordis to support the 
Abyei local mediation. 
Mediation Methods 
The mediation followed a model developed 
in Sudan in the 1990s: the people-to-people 
peace process (PPP), which takes the form 
of peace meetings and conferences. This is 
like the community peace and reconciliation 
conferences in Greater Darfur and Kordofan, 
known as Judiya, managed by native 
administration under local governance.12 
This inclusive peace and reconciliation 
initiative, which emerged in Sudan during 
the height of the SPLM/A civil war in the 
1990s, was meant to address conflict 
among communities in the SPLA-liberated 
areas, especially the impact of the 1991 
split within the liberation movement on 
local communities. The process includes: 
trust building, storytelling, traditional 
peace-building techniques, reconciliation, 
10 Interview with chief Bakat of Manuar Ngok Dinka section…….
11 Concordis Final Progress Report: Strengthening Civil Society Organizations to Adopt Nonviolence as a   Strategy for Peacebuilding 
and Promoting Social Cohesion in Sudan
12 Abdul-Jalil, M., Mohammed, A. A. and Yousuf, A. (2007) Native Administration and Local Governance in Darfur: Past and Future. In De 
Waal, A. (editor) War in Darfur and The Search For Peace. USA: Global Equity Initiative, Harvard University. 39-67.
13 Ashworth, J. (2014) The Voice of the Voiceless:The Role of the Church in the Sudanese Civil war 1983-2005. Nairobi, Kenya: Paulines 
Publications Africa.
14 Concordis Final Progress Report: Strengthening Civil Society Organizations to Adopt Nonviolence as a   Strategy for Peacebuilding 
and Promoting Social Cohesion in Sudan.
symbolism, and imagery.13 The Abyei 
community peace initiative followed similar 
models: meetings and conferences to hear 
stories of the conflict, building trust and 
confidence, and soliciting proposals to 
promote consensus and the way forward. 
These hybrid models integrate traditional 
values, and modern peace-building 
techniques, as seen in Wunlit. After several 
meetings, a peace agreement was signed 
on 25 February 2016 in Noong, about 14 
kilometres West of Abyei.14  
Terms of Agreement and 
Implementation Mechanisms
The agreement was meant to address 
grievances and drivers of inter-communal 
tensions. These included provisions for 
the secession of violence and hostilities, 
setting security conditions and protective 
measures, commitment to peaceful 
coexistence, returning abductees, opening 
of routes, Misseriya access to water and 
pasture, conflict resolution mechanisms, 
and the establishment of a peace market. 
High-level mediation and peace agreements 
tend to focus on power and elite interests, 
but LPAs focus on day-to-day conflict 
dynamics and community needs such as 
livelihood, security, and economic activities. 
The main implementation mechanism 
for the agreement was the formation of 
the JCPC comprised of 10 Ngok Dinka 
and 10 Misseriya. This governing body’s 
functions included coordinating with 
UNISFA, organising migration conferences, 
supporting conflict resolution, ruling on 
compensation and overseeing the work of its 
sub-committees, including the community 
police committee (CPC), a joint court (JC), 
and a committee on trade. There is also a 
detention centre (two containers) provided 
by UNISFA.
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Joint Community Peace Committee
The JCPC resolves conflict and manages 
potential violent issues such as cattle 
theft and raids. Their responsibilities also 
include management of revenge killings 
and compensation. The primary means 
of demonstrating accountability between 
tribes is the payment of blood money (puk 
and diya), and/or the return of stolen goods, 
normally cattle. Blood payment for homicide 
is 31 cows. Those who do not have cows, 
pay in cash an amount of 10,000 SSP per 
cow, roughly 40 USD. The offender pays for 
treatment of those they have injured. This 
ensures different forms of accountability for 
offences committed, such as payment of 
blood price, fines, community service, and 
apologies are based on restorative justice 
procedures. Blood price is defined by the 
groups that are liable for payment. Therefore, 
once identified as a mechanism for resolving 
a dispute, it defines that dispute as involving 
the corresponding group diya or puk paying 
group.
JCPC Sub-committees
The JCPC also oversees the work of its 
sub-committees. The CPC is composed 
of 17 members from each community 
that monitor events taking place in the 
market. They are not armed but can be 
identified by official badges. Criminals are 
handled by CPC in each community.  The 
JC handles issues of theft, looting, and 
some disagreements. The JC membership 
comprises of four experienced chiefs from 
each community who handle cases arising 
from the market. Customary law is applied 
to civil as well as criminal cases. UNISFA 
has provided two containers for custody 
and committed to constructing a permanent 
facility. These sub-committees report to the 
JCPC which coordinates with UNISFA on 
security matters.  
Image 1
Members of the 
Joint Community 
Peace Committee 
(JCPC)
Image 2
Members of the 
Joint Court (JC)
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Amiet Peace Market: A Success Story?
The peace market is situated in Amiet 
area, about 16 kilometres north of Abyei 
Town, opened on 10 August 2016. It is an 
outcome of one of the resolutions of the 
joint meetings between representatives 
of Ngok Dinka and Misseriya in February 
2016.15 Daily interactions take place between 
Ngok and Misseriya in Amiet Market. Several 
respondents emphasised that the market 
is one of the biggest achievements of the 
agreement. The reopening of trade routes 
between Sudan and South Sudan allowed for 
free flow of goods. Food supplies and other 
commodities are also transported to South 
Sudan. Economic gain is brought to both 
communities.  One of the participants said: 
“economic activity is an important peace 
dividend because it makes people interact, 
15 Conversation with the Parish Priest of Abyei Catholic Parish (26/3/2019). 
16 Interview 3 with a FAO staff in Abyei (22/3/2019).
promote relationships, and sustain the 
different constituencies.”16 With the opening 
of trade routes, South Sudanese travel with 
ease to Khartoum and other towns. A key 
influence in the success of the Peace Market 
is the JCPC’s commitment, supported by the 
IOM, FAO, and UNISFA.  
The market is dominated by the Misseriya 
who employ Ngok youth as porters and 
helpers. Some shops are shared between 
Misseriya traders and Ngok Dinka, but this 
is an unequal partnership as Ngok traders 
are mostly tea sellers. Ngok mainly benefit 
from revenue from leased land to Misseriya 
traders and from access to commodities in 
the market. 
Image 3
Old detention 
centre
Image 4
New detention centre 
under construction
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Challenges in the common market
One of the main challenges highlighted 
by the JCPC and other participants in the 
Amiet area is capacity to manage the rapidly 
growing market. The market has expanded 
beyond its initially imagined size and has 
attracted people from the neighbouring 
states of South Sudan as well as different 
parts of Sudan. There is also a high rate of 
theft and criminality.17 The lack of formal 
functioning government institutions makes 
it difficult to enforce law and order. There is 
therefore a need for reliable security as the 
market continues to expand. 
Disputes in the market often lead to violent 
confrontations which can result in homicide 
as many people are armed. Failure to 
pay compensation for lives lost in such 
17 Interview 5 with a Misseriya trader (24/3/2019).
confrontations occasionally raises tensions 
between the two communities and provokes 
revenge attacks. Key conflict drivers in 
and around the market include cattle raids, 
transactional disputes, grazing areas, and 
access to water for cattle. There are many 
street children and commercial sex workers 
in Amiet shanty towns. Many children do not 
attend school and instead beg at the market. 
The area lacks basic services such as health 
facilities, schools, water sources, veterinary 
services, and roads. These needs are 
associated with the expansion of the market. 
Image 5
Amiet Peace 
Market
Image 6
Misseriya Shop in 
Amiet Market
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Impact of the Agreement: 
Achievements
The peace process’ main aim was to reduce 
violence and build relationship between 
Ngok and Misseriya. Conflict between 
the two communities has reduced, and 
peaceful pastoral migration of Misseriya 
in the AAA’s locations has continued since 
the peace agreement was signed in 2016.  
The reopening of trade routes between 
Sudan and South Sudan has allowed for 
the free flow of goods. Food supplies 
and commodities are also transported 
to other areas of South Sudan. South 
Sudanese travel with ease to Khartoum 
and other Sudanese towns for various 
needs. Relationships between the Ngok and 
Misseriya are gradually rebuilding through 
daily interactions in the peace market. A 
Ngok respondent stressed that “the coming 
of the two communities to interact and 
trade in Amiet market is the best that has 
happened in Abyei area.”18 The JCPC and its 
sub-committees serve as the nucleus for 
wider peaceful coexistence and continue to 
manage, resolve, and prevent conflicts in and 
around the market. Ngok Dinka displaced 
by the Abyei wars of 2008 and 2011 have 
returned to Abyei in large numbers and there 
is free movement between Abyei and Agok. 
The inclusive process, with good access 
to the negotiating parties, is a strength of 
LPA. Most high-level negotiations on the 
Abyei conflict have taken place outside 
the area. Addressing issues at the local 
level, as the LPA has strived to do, builds 
trust, confidence, and leads to changes in 
perception through daily interaction. 
While acknowledging the effectiveness 
of the Abyei local agreement, it is equally 
important to highlight the role of external 
actors. Concordis has been applauded 
for facilitating the peace process. A 
18 Interview 12 with a Ngok woman in Agok (20/3/2019).
19 Interview 2 with a Ngok Journalist in Agok (17/3/2019).
20 Interview 6 with Abyei women representative (18/3/2019).
21 Johnson, D. H. (2014b) South Sudan’s Experience at Peacemaking: The 22nd Annual Ghandi Peace Festival. In Bertrand Russel Peace 
Lecture: Symposium on Conflict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan. MacMaster, University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. Page 7.  
respondent said “because of the excellent 
work of Concordis, there is now interaction 
unlike a few years ago when contact was 
only through the Abyei Joint Oversight 
Committee (AJOC).”19 Another respondent 
asserted “what Concordis has done, the two 
governments and international mediation 
failed to do since 2005.”20 Random killings 
have decreased, and there is accountability 
when murder does occur. Concordis 
facilitated the peace process, but the 
support of UNISFA and the AU was equally 
significant. After 2016, Concordis left work 
in Abyei because of funding restraints, but 
peace meetings continued, facilitated by 
UNISFA and other actors such as WFP, IOM, 
and FAO.    
Limitations of Local Peace 
Agreements 
One of the major weaknesses of the LPA 
is its dependency on local government 
and external actors’ support for the 
implementation of resolutions. The 
government’s role is important not only in 
guaranteeing security and facilitating the 
process, but also in its implementation. 
Where the government is absent or lax in 
its responsibilities, full implementation of 
a popular agreement is impossible.21 In the 
case of Abyei, a large amount of this role 
has been played by UNISFA. Again, a lack 
of logistical and financial support could 
jeopardise local peace efforts. Thus, the 
participation of external agencies, whether 
churches, national and international NGOs, 
or international governmental agencies, 
has been important to this model of peace-
making. 
The Abyei LPA has been praised as a 
success story but criticised for its lack of 
inclusivity. Women were not directly involved 
in the talks, and only played a peripheral 
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role. But conflict affects men and women 
differently; getting the insights of women in 
negotiations is vital, as women can introduce 
views and concerns that male tribal leaders 
often fail to consider. A key example is 
the physical, economic, and psychosocial 
impact of sexual violence and abductions 
suffered by women.
The Role of UNISFA Since 2011
UNISFA was established by Security 
Council Resolution 1990 of 27 June 
2011, in response to the Abyei situation 
characterised by violence, escalating 
tensions, and population displacement. This 
followed the agreement signed between 
the GoS and the SPLM in Addis Ababa, to 
demilitarise Abyei and have Ethiopian troops 
monitor the area.22 The operation has been 
tasked with monitoring the flashpoint border, 
facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, 
and is authorised to use force in protecting 
civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei. 
Since then, UNISFA has been protecting 
civilians, securing access for humanitarian 
assistance, mediating migration-based 
conflicts, facilitating the return of displaced 
persons, and demilitarising the border 
region.
UNISFA’s mandate includes “security within 
the Abyei Area,” “support and capacity 
building to Abyei Police Service,” and 
“protection of civilians under imminent 
threat” (Article 27).23 It provides capacity 
to the JCPC to support apprehension 
of serious criminals. But UNISFA does 
not have the authority to try suspects or 
detain them for extended periods.24 The 
Mission is to brief and report to the AJOC, 
which then reports to the Presidents of 
Sudan and South Sudan. In the absence of 
formal government and law enforcement 
in Abyei, UNISFA found itself acting as a 
police force to arrest criminals, and in the 
22 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unisfa (Accessed on 6 February 2019). 
23 https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13578.doc.htm (Accessed on 10 December 2019).
24 Concordis confidential paper: Development in Abyei arising out of the growth of Amiet market.
25 Interview 2 with a Ngok Journalist in Agok (17/3/2019).
26 Interview 21 with a Misseriya member of Joint Court (22/3/2019).
absence of prisons, detaining and providing 
for prisoners. UNISFA has been repairing 
roads and creating airstrips. Because of the 
absence of peacebuilding mechanisms in 
Abyei, UNISFA sometimes gets involved in 
peace-making and peacebuilding activities.
But research participants hold mixed 
views about UNISFA’s role in Abyei. The 
Mission is seen to have failed to secure 
the entire Abyei area. More than half (12) 
of the Ngok participants held an opinion 
that UNISFA may be under the influence of 
the GoS. The rationale is that despite Abyei 
being a contested area, Sudan claims full 
sovereignty by issuing visas to UNISFA 
staff. The staff must enter Abyei through 
Khartoum and are charged USD 100 each 
time they enter and re-enter. However, the 
Status of Force Agreement (SOFA), signed 
by both governments and UN, UNISFA, and 
other international staff could enter Abyei 
from Juba or Khartoum. Alleged pressure 
from the Khartoum government under 
former President Al-Bashir also restricts 
UNISFA from rendering services to the 
people of Abyei. A Ngok participant asserted: 
“The road project between Abyei and Agok 
promised since 2014 for example is not yet 
done because Khartoum considers the road 
a security risk to Sudan.”25 
Conversely, some claims made above are 
contradicted by other participants. One 
respondent said that without UNISFA, Abyei 
would not be what it is today, especially 
regarding the provision of security and 
protection.26 UNISFA facilitated the return 
and resettlement of displaced people from 
Agok. The Mission provides water, boreholes, 
repairs schools, health and detention 
centres, and construction of women and 
youth centres in Abyei, Todash, and Diffra 
under its Quick Impact Projects (QIP). 
More than half of participants confirmed 
that UNISFA is the main service provider in 
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Abyei. A UN respondent explained: “Abyei is 
a contested area, you can’t resolve conflict 
in the state of emptiness. With the absence 
of standard government assistance, the 
people are without development, we must 
fill the gaps.”27 Another respondent noted 
that the budget of the AAA is for salary only, 
not for security and development.28 UNISFA 
has also constructed an airstrip in Atoi, west 
of the River Kiir, to lessen the burden of 
transporting forces through Khartoum. But 
as UNISFA has no civilian head of mission, 
the Force Commander combines political 
and military responsibilities. Participants 
expressed the need for the appointment of a 
Civilian Head of Mission.
Interactions with State and 
International Dynamics
The LPA influences broader conflict 
dynamics because there is always 
interaction between local mediation and 
high-level politics. The Abyei conflict 
consists of two aspects: a local, involving 
pastoralists from Sudan who move into 
Abyei to access water and pasture; and a 
national, due to contestation of the area for 
reasons connected with national politics 
and resources.29 The presence of oil along 
that international border has added another 
layer to the conflict, such that it also reflects 
the economic interests of Sudan and South 
Sudan. This has required local mediation 
to interact with state and international 
mechanisms such as the AJOC and UNISFA. 
AJOC meetings in Addis Ababa discuss 
issues related to interactions between the 
two communities. UNISFA provides security 
in Abyei to allow free movement and trains 
members of the CPC. UN Agencies such 
as WFP, IOM, FAO have played key roles in 
supporting community projects. 
27 Interview 9 with a FAO official in Abyei (18/3/2019).
28 Interview 11 with an official of AAA (20/3/2019).
29 https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2016/10/conflict-resolution-through-dialogue-south-sudan (Accessed on 17 October 2019).
30 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2445.pdf (Accessed 22 
June 2019).
31 Interview 11 with a journalist in Agok (21 April/ 2019).
32 Interview 19 with a civil society member (27/April/ 2019).
Interactions between the two communities 
are likely to have governmental support. 
Constituting JCPC members from both 
communities means that both governments 
have sanctioned their functions. Moreover, 
issues discussed in the seasonal migration 
conferences have touched on high-level 
national and international politics that have 
characterised the longstanding tensions 
between the two communities. In the pre-
migration conference that took place in 
Todash between 22-23 March 2019, the 
issue of land rights and ownership featured 
prominently. Part of the core problem has 
been the passing of UN resolution 2445 
which acknowledges the administration 
headquarters of Ngok Dinka in Abyei Town 
and of Misseriya in Muglad.30 The Misseriya 
and GoS were angered by their apparent 
exclusion from rights over Abyei.  In late 
January 2019, the Misseriya rejected a 
letter31 of the UN Secretary General which 
called for a referendum according to an 
AUHIP proposal, and claimed that all the 
Misseriya within Sudan have the right to 
enter and settle in Abyei area.32  
The conference title, “pre-migration,” also 
caused tension. Misseriya said they are not 
migrating from anywhere but moving their 
cattle within the area. They argued that the 
word migration means that someone is 
coming from somewhere, and so demanded 
removal of the word from the document. The 
Ngok on their part said Abyei is defined as 
the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms, 
therefore, to remove the word ‘migration’ 
means accepting that Misseriya have land 
rights in the area. Ngok further argued 
that if Abyei is a shared area, why did 
Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) destroy it and 
Misseriya loot property in 2008 and 2011, 
before killing the Paramount chief in 2013? 
These international politics dominated the 
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meeting’s agenda and prevented meaningful 
resolution of more pressing local issues 
pertaining to pastoral migrations. Wider 
political issues tended to derail the entire 
functionality of the JCPC and efforts at 
local peace-making. The focus of the PPP 
conference should be peaceful coexistence 
and resolving issues that arise from shared 
use of resources. 
Implications for the Abyei Final 
Status
The agreement has several implications 
for the Abyei final status. Ngok Dinka 
are concerned about Misseriya and GoS 
attempts to consider Amiet as a border 
between Sudan and South Sudan. Amiet 
market is within the Abyei area as defined by 
the PCA, but has attracted many Misseriya 
who settled within the area. These settlers 
are well armed, and there are frequent cases 
of killings in the area. Ngok claimed that 
the GoS has a strategic plan to push them 
further South. The continued settlement of 
Misseriya within the Abyei area would have 
significant implications if a referendum on 
Abyei was ever held, and something that 
could spark renewed conflict. On the other 
hand, the Ngok’s call for recognition of their 
unilateral referendum’s result of 31 October 
2013 by the GoS and the international 
community could equally spark a new 
round of conflict. Thus, while good for the 
community, the LPA may shift the landscape 
and dynamics of conflict. 
Part of the difficulties in arriving at the Abyei 
Final Status seem linked to politicians from 
both areas. Provincial elites often take 
hard lines, and it is not clear whether they 
are pursuing their own narrow interests, or 
responding to demands from their own local 
constituents. Locals are flexible on local 
issues, but do not seem to have significant 
leverage at higher levels. This has created 
a situation that continues to defy modern 
mediation and any efforts of addressing the 
Abyei issue. But there are linkages between 
local and national interests in the conflict. 
The LPA has a significant contribution to 
mediating the local aspects of the conflict, 
but the broader issue of the final status of 
Abyei will only come when the problems 
between Sudan and South Sudan are 
resolved at the government level.
Policy Recommendations
To resolve the Abyei local issues, parties 
should focus on a settlement which 
addresses the specific aspirations of both 
Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities 
in a balanced manner. Agreements 
around common interests need to be 
emphasised, rather than focusing on areas 
of difference. These include migration 
movements, security, economic activities, 
and development. There is a need for 
coordination of efforts at all levels, from 
grassroots to the existing structures in 
Abyei, and to the different institutions that 
are involved in supporting those maintaining 
peace and security, including the peace 
market. Amiet Market is an excellent place 
for promoting and consolidating peace, but 
mechanisms need to be put in place for 
regulating and monitoring criminality, so the 
market does not become another source of 
problems and/or spoiler to the agreement. 
There is a need to train and strengthen the 
JCPC on policy issues to effectively exercise 
their central role in conflict mitigation and 
addressing conflict drivers in the community, 
to train and empower personnel on the 
ground, volunteers, and those who are 
working as police personnel. They are to be 
recognised and possibly put in uniform so 
that they are respected as people working 
on peace and security in the market. Abyei 
area is a demilitarised zone, so no organised 
forces should be allowed to enter the area 
with their guns. Similarly, no party should be 
allowed to enter the area if they are armed. 
AJOC Sudan has its representative in Diffra 
inside the Abyei area. If the community 
peace is to be sustained, AJOC Sudan, SAF, 
and Misseriya armed men should withdraw 
from the area.
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Conclusion 
The LPA is not meant to resolve the 
broader conflict but to reduce violence and 
contribute to solutions. The Abyei conflict 
is nested within national and inter-state 
conflict. A lasting solution to the problem 
is dependent on the resolution of issues 
between Khartoum and Juba. The larger 
question is how to reconcile the interests 
of these four key groups in the conflict: 
the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya, and the 
Sudan and South Sudan governments. 
For any resolution to be acceptable to the 
majority on both sides, their perceptions 
about how their interests can be satisfied 
will have to change. It is important for 
parties and communities to recognise and 
respect the reality that the fundamental 
objective of the Abyei Protocol was to 
address the aspirations and interests of the 
Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya in a balanced 
and mutually beneficial manner, as reflected, 
for instance, in the administrative and other 
arrangements during the CPA interim period.  
The establishment of local committees such 
as the JCPC that focus on inter-communal 
relations is a short-term solution, which may 
contribute to a lasting solution. 
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